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Kadi in Sight of Autopoiesis 
 
Jennifer Hendry* 
 
 
Abstract  
 
The long-running saga of the prominent Kadi case raises a variety of issues, not least 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)¶s overt acknowledgment of the 
European Union (EU) as a µvirtuous international actor¶ (de Búrca 2009) in terms of 
rights protection, and the monism / dualism / pluralism issue in terms of global 
governance. This chapter will consider these from the standpoint of autopoiesis or 
'systems' theory in order to present a fresh perspective on both legal-systemic unity 
and considerations of µjustice¶ vis-à-vis human rights. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the past decade the name Kadi has become well known to legal scholars, 
especially those with interests in European Union (EU) law, EU external relations, 
EU constitutionalism, fundamental rights, global administrative law, international 
security, international law, and the fight against global terrorism. Indeed, the surname 
of Mr. Yassin Abdullah Kadi has since 2001 come to represent a variety of 
arguments, approaches and standpoints, and to encompass all of this reasoning and all 
of these articles and judgments under a single word that is simultaneously 
representative of and detached from the individual most profoundly affected by the 
case. The attenuation of the legal hullabaloo from the human individual at its heart is 
mirrored by this chapter, which will proceed in a similar vein of engagement and 
GHWDFKPHQWLQWHUPVRIWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVDQGFRQWRXUVRI0U.DGL¶VSDUWLFXODUFDVH1 
its effects and repercussions, and the scholarly discussion arising from it.  
 
This chapter takes as its core approach and frame the theory of autopoietic social 
systems (systems theory) established and made famous by Niklas Luhmann,2 and 
most notably further developed in relation to law and normativity by Gunther 
Teubner. 3  :KLOH D µradically antihumanist, radically antiregional, and radically 
FRQVWUXFWLYLVWLF¶ WKHRU\ PLJKW DSSHDU WR EH D VWUDQJH RQH WR XWLOL]H ZKHQ WKH IRFXV
                                                        
*
 Lecturer in Jurisprudence and Deputy director, Centre for European Law & Legal Studies, University 
of Leeds School of Law. I am grateful to Clive Walker for his time in discussion of this case, and to 
Tom Webb for his comments on an earlier draft. The usual disclaimer applies. 
 
1
 Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P. Also, Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P, Kadi 
and Al Barakaat, judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 3 September 2008. In 2008 the Court was 
still the European Court of Justice (ECJ) but by 2013 it had been renamed the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU). 
2
 See, for example, Niklas Luhmann, The Differentiation of Society (Columbia University Press 1982); 
Social Systems (Stanford 1995); and Law As A Social System (OUP 2004). 
3
 See, for example, Gunther Teubner, Law As An Autopoietic System (Blackwell 1998); µ7KH
$QRQ\PRXV0DWUL[+XPDQ5LJKWV9LRODWLRQVE\µ3ULYDWH¶7UDQVQDWLRQDO$FWRUV¶LQ69 Modern Law 
Review 327-346 (2006). See also Gunther Teubner, µ6RFLHWDO&RQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP$OWHUQDWLYHVWR6WDWH-
Centred &RQVWLWXWLRQDO7KHRU\"¶6WRUUV/HFWXUHV<DOH/DZ6FKRROLQ&KULVWLDQ-RHUJHV
Inger-Johanne Sand and Gunther Teubner (eds) Constitutionalism and Transnational Governance 
(Hart 2004), and Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globali 
 2 
rests, as it does here, upon the respective authority claims of international and 
European Union law, and human rights protection under the EU and UN regimes, I 
submit that systems theory offers a useful different angle on world society 
(WeltgesellschaftWKHOHJDOV\VWHP¶VRechtssystem) regulation of the social, and the 
possibilities and potentialities in functional differentiation, pluralism and 
fragmentation. The modest aim of this chapter is to scrutinize and critique from the 
perspective of systems theory the main strands of the Kadi legal saga. The facts have 
already been covered comprehensively in the introduction to this volume so I will not 
repeat them beyond what is required for clarity and will instead proceed directly to 
RXWOLQHWKHFRPSRQHQWSDUWVRIWKLVFKDSWHU¶VDQDO\VLV 
 
Foremost among these strands is the issue of human rights protection and its corollary 
RIJRRGJRYHUQDQFH7KH&-(8¶VGHFLVLon in Kadi can be taken to represent its overt 
declaration to be a human rights actor in its own right. The position taken by the 
*UDQG&KDPEHULQ-XO\ZDVWRXSKROGWKH&RXUW¶VFDVWLQJRIWKH(8DVD
µYLUWXRXV LQWHUQDWLRQDO DFWRU¶4 and to privilege the rule of law and its protection of 
individual fundamental rights over compliance with an international regime providing 
a lesser standard and offering lesser guarantees. While the political motivations of the 
(XURSHDQ&RXUW¶VMXGLFLDU\LQWDNLQJVXFh a hard line on EU legal autonomy could of 
FRXUVHEHTXHULHGWKH&-(8¶VILUPVWDQFHFRQFHUQLQJLWVGHFLVLRQLQ.DGLKDG
the effect of reifying the position that, within the EU at least, fundamental rights 
FDQQRW EH HURGHG µXQGHU WKH FRYHU RI JHQHULF VHFXULW\ FRQFHUQV¶. 5  Such overt 
commitment to rights protection and rights compliant action would be viewed in a 
positive light by both of the main protagonists of systems theory; nevertheless it is 
important to note that there is no clear consensus between the two as to the scope of 
rights within the theory. The reason for this is that it is within the field of rights that 
the differences between the determinedly non-normative sociological approach of 
Luhmann6 and the more normatively open (no pun intended) standpoint adopted by 
Teubner7 DUHFDVWLQVKDUSHVWUHOLHI7KHµULJKWV¶VHFWLRQRIWKLVFKDSWHUZLOOWHDVHRXW
the differences between the two approaches and relate them both to the issue of 
fundamental rights in the case of Kadi DQGWKHQWRµJRRGJRYHUQDQFH¶ZLWKLQWKH(8
ZKLFKLVWRVD\LQWHUPVRIWKH(8¶VVHOI-description as a virtuous actor.  
 
The next strand to come under scrutiny will be that of the conflict over the locus of 
ultimate legal authority, which could be phrased as the question of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz. It can be said that Kadi represents a marked departure for the CJEU from 
its µtraditional embrace of international law¶ and a reorientation more towards a more 
pluralist approach to the issue of the µmultiplication, overlap and conflict of normative 
orders in the global realm¶ 8  This change of direction is at odds with the more 
                                                        
4
 GráLQQH GH %~UFD µ7KH (XURSHDQ &RXUW RI -XVWLFH DQG WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /HJDO 2UGHU $IWHU Kadi¶
(2009) 51 Harvard International Law Journal 1-49, 1  
5
 Filippo Fontanelli, http://www.diritticomparati.it/2013/07/kadi-ii-or-the-happy-ending-of-ks-trial-
court-of-justice-of-the-european-union-18-july-2013.html, accessed September 2013, 5 
6
 Niklas Luhmann, Grundrechte als Institution (Duncker and Humblot 1965). See also Gert 
Verschraegen, µHuman Rights and Modern Society: A Sociological Analysis from the Perspective of 
Systems Theory, 29 Journal of Law & Society (2002) 258-281, 261 
7
 *XQWKHU7HXEQHUµ7KH$QRQ\PRXV0DWUL[+XPDQ5LJKWV9LRODWLRQVE\µ3ULYDWH¶7UDQVQDWLRQDO
$FWRUV¶Modern Law Review 69; DOVRµ-XVWLFH8QGHU*OREDO&DSLWDOLVP¶0LFKDHO%OHFKHUDQG
-HQQLIHU+HQGU\HGVµ*RYHUQDQFH&LYLO6RFLHW\DQG6RFLDO0RYHPHQWV6SHFLDO,VVXH¶Law & 
Critique 19(3) 329-334. 
8
 Gráinne de Búrca supra note 4, 36. 
 3 
obliging approaches taken by both the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and 
the Court of First Instance (CFI), which adopted positions that could be described as 
µVWURQJO\ FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVW¶.9 However, it cannot simply be downplayed as a misstep 
on the part of the CJEU. On the contrary, the Kadi case appears to have been selected 
LQWHQWLRQDOO\DVWKHSODWIRUPIRUWKH&RXUW¶Vµ\RXVKDOOQRWSDVV¶10 moment, whereby it 
DVVHUWHG WKH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ¶V GLVWLQFWLYHQHVV DQG VHSDUDWLRQ IURP WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO
order.11 It appears that the opportunity presented itself in Kadi for a clear statement of 
EU autonomy in the international realm and this chance was seized upon by the 
CJEU. From a systems-theoretical perspective, the points of interest here are this 
robust assertion of autonomy on the part of the CJEU and its result in generating a 
situation of overt plurality within international (multi-level) governance. A systems 
approach here not only elides, after a fashion, the hard regime boundaries that lawyers 
are used to working with and within, but also facilitates the accommodation of such 
complexity by means of its founding premise of functional differentiation.12  
 
Finally, a little attention ought to be paid to the individual-nominate of the case in 
question, Mr. Kadi, or rather, to his status and position within systems theory. This 
will form the focus of the next section, subsequent to which the sections will follow 
RQ WKH WRSLFV RI KXPDQ ULJKWV µJRRG¶ JRYHUQDQFH DQG ZLOO FRQFOXGH ZLWK D
discussion of multi-level governance, plurality and authority. 
 
Mr. Kadi in Sight of Autopoiesis 
 
As stated above, systems theory is at variance to the majority of sociological theories 
that, more conventionally, hold the human actor, the human agent, to be the 
protagonist of activity within the social. In spite of being renowned (or notorious) for 
its ambivalent treatment of human individuals, 13  systems theory is not, as often 
alleged, an entirely anti-individualistic theory. On the contrary, individual human 
beings have an important dual role within systems theory: they exist both as psychic 
autopoietic systems in their own right as well as being point of attributions for the 
elements of the system, communications. This deliberate decentering of the individual 
within systems theory can be explained by reference to what Luhmann was aiming to 
accomplish, namely to construct a complete theory of society.14 Taking as his starting 
premise the idea that µVRFLHW\ >«@ZDVQHYHUKXPDQ¶ WKDW µWKHQRWLRQRID³KXPDQ
                                                        
9
 ibid, 19ff and 38-42. 
10
 :KLOH WKLV LV KDUGO\ DQ REVFXUH UHIHUHQFH , VKRXOG SRLQW RXW WKDW LW FRPHV IURP -55 7RONLHQ¶V
Gandalf in The Fellowship of the Ring and denotes extreme wizarding stubbornness. 
11
 Gráinne de Búrca, supra note 4, 4. 
12
 The founding premise may be more accurately cited as the fundamental distinction between system 
and environment, from which functional differentiation ± that is to say, the differentiation of social 
subsystems on the basis of their function ± can be said to stem. This functional differentiation 
establishes the boundary between a system and its environment: for example, the legal system (system) 
and society (environment). Other function systems include: politics, the economy, science, education, 
religion, the mass media, art and sport. 
13
 Zenon Bankowski, µ+RZ'RHV,W)HHO7R%H2Q<RXU2ZQ"¶7KH3HUVRQLQ6LJKWRI$XWRSRLHVLV¶
7(2) Ratio Juris (1994) 254-266)RUDUHSO\WR%DQNRZVNL¶VDUJXPHQWVHH-RKQ3DWHUVRQ µ:KR,V
Zenon Bankowski Talking To? The PerVRQLQ6LJKWRI$XWRSRLHVLV¶8(2) Ratio Juris (1995) 212-29 
14
 There is an old rumour in circulation about Luhmann, who, it is alleged, on his appointment to the 
Sociology Department at the University of Bielefeld in 1969, was asked for details about his project. 
His answer was: Project: to develop a theory of society; Duration: thirty years; Cost: none. 
 4 
EHLQJ´KDVDOZD\VEHHQWKHRUHWLFDOO\SUREOHPDWLFDQGDVRFLRORJ\EDVHGXSRQKXPDQ
WHUPVKDV DOZD\VEHHQ PLVJXLGHG¶,15 Luhmann¶V DSSURDFKZDV DQ Dntihumanist one 
that attempted to move beyond thinking of society in merely human terms.  This 
decentering required a number of elegant moves on /XKPDQQ¶V part but the main one 
was the recognition of communications over actions as the systemic elements, which 
in turn facilitated the all-important distinction to be drawn between 
system/environment, removing the requirement for further reliance upon the classic 
dichotomy of subject/object. Luhmann combined these insights to produce an 
µRYHUDUFKLQJ HSLVWHPRORJLFDO IUDPHZRUN¶ WKDW µRUJDQLVHG DQG VWUXFWXUHG
communicative processes by providing for the autopoietic linkage of communicative 
DFWV WR RWKHU FRPPXQLFDWLYH DFWV LQ WKH IRUP RI ³FRGHV´ ³SURJUDPPHV´ ³PHGLD´
³H[SHFWDWLRQV´¶16  
 
Under a systems-theoretical construction, therefore, world society can be described as 
D µPXOWLWXGH RI VHOI-FRQVWLWXWHG DQG IXQFWLRQDOO\ GLIIHUHQWLDWHG VRFLDO VXEV\VWHPV¶,17 
such as politics, the economy, education, law, health, art, and so on, in relation to 
which individuals participate on a daily basis but within which they are never 
included nor into which are they ever subsumed. It can be stated thus, that Mr. Kadi is 
neither, nor was he ever, a part of the legal system, and this in spite of his engagement 
with legal orders of both the UN and the EU. He, along with his lawyers and 
representatives, the judges and advocates-general, even the academics, has no more 
physical place within the legal system than he does in any other function system, 
which is to say, none whatsoever. The interaction of individuals with a system is 
always-already determined by the system; in this fashion a human being can be a 
point of communicative attribution or a source of systemic perturbation, or can even 
be constituted by a system ± indeed, by any number of systems ± as actors within it.18  
We can say that Mr. Kadi is constituted by the relevant social systems as, among 
other things, an economic actor, a EU citizen, and a bearer of human rights.19 
 
It is concerning the issue of human rights, however, that the role of the individual in 
systems theory is perhaps the most counterintuitive, as a result of the disconnect 
between their psychic and social selves. Teubner conveys this as follows:  
 
µ7KHSDUDGR[LFDOFLUFXODUUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQVRFLHW\DQGLQGLYLdual (society 
constitutes the individual person, who in turn constitutes society) is, as it were, 
the a priori that underlies all historically variable human rights concepts. 
Flesh-and-blood people, communicatively constituted as persons, make 
themselves disruptively noticeable, despite all their socialization, as non-
                                                        
15
 Hans-Georg Moeller, The Radical Luhmann (Columbia University Press: 2012) 21 
16
 0RULW]5HQQHUµ'HDWK%\&RPSOH[LW\± The Financial Crisis and the Crisis of Law in World 
6RFLHW\¶,QKjaer, P., Teubner, G. and Febbrajo, A. (eds) The Financial Crisis in Constitutional 
Perspective: The Dark Side of Functional Differentiation (Hart: 2011)  
17
 -LUt3ULEiQµ0XOWLSOH6RYHUHLJQW\2Q(XURSH¶V6HOI-Constitutionalization and Legal Self-
Reference¶5DWLR-XULV±64, 42 
18
 Richard Nobles and David Schiff, Observing Law Through Systems Theory (Hart: 2013) 253 
19
 Space unfortunately does not permit me to engage with the temporal issue raised by the discrepancy 
of ruling as far as rights protection is concerned between the CFI, the ECtHR, and the CJEU. For a 
general discussion of time in terms of systems theory, see Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems (Stanford 
UP 1995) 41-52 
 5 
communicatively constituted individuals/bodies, and hammer for their 
µULJKWV¶20  
 
It is important to note here that human rights attach, nay, belong to a human being as 
a human beingWRWKHLQGLYLGXDOLQVWHDGRIWKHµSHUVRQ¶ZLWKLQDIXQFWLRQV\VWHP7KH
QH[WVHFWLRQZLOODQDO\]HWKHµUROH¶RIULJKWVZLWKLQV\VWHPVWKHRU\LQPRUHGHWDLODQG
with specific reference to the Kadi case. 
 
Human Rights  
 
In systems theory, rights are conceptualized as a social institution by means of which 
VRFLHW\LVDEOHWRµSURWHFWLWVRZQVWUXFWXUHDJDLQVWVHOI-GHVWUXFWLYHWHQGHQFLHV¶21 For 
Luhmann, rights operate as political communications that serve to introduce self-
limitations to the political system; in essence, they provide a restraint on the potential 
excesses of the political system (power), which otherwise would tend to exert too 
great an influence upon individuals within society, which in turn has detrimental 
effects upon and within the social. This can be best observed in terms of participation 
or inclusion: property rights facilitate participation within the economy, for example, 
while freedom of expression provides communications for the systems of the media 
and art, to name but two, while at the same time ensuring variety within politics. 
 
,W LV LPSRUWDQW WR QRWH KHUH WKDW /XKPDQQ¶V FRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQ RI ULJKWV LV QHLWKHU
liberal nor ideological but rather completely sociological, which is to say that he 
omits any rose-tintedness in favour of a robustly functionalist understanding. To him 
rights are a social institution with a precise function, namely, to protect the society 
from the dangers of functional differentiation. Rights represent a curb upon systemic 
operations in that they constitute coalesced and concretized expectations, which, in 
their very concreteness, take on the nature of fixed points, of facts. Fundamental 
rights therefore have innate facticity ± they are universal and individual human 
entitlements 22  - DQG RSHUDWH WR µSURWHFW the autonomy of spheres of action from 
political instrumentalizDWLRQ¶. 23  Without such limitations upon its operations, the 
political system runs the risk of over-extending its influence and imposing thresholds 
RIUHJXODWLRQWKDWXQGHUPLQHµWKHDELOLW\RIRWher systems to operate in ways that are 
SURGXFWLYHIRUVRFLHW\¶.24  
 
The functional importance of rights is easier to recognize when cast against the 
backdrop of the highly specialized global systems of world society, which is where 
those excesses relevant to the Kadi case can be identified. The identification of the 
political and economic systems as having been guilty of overstepping their bounds 
                                                        
20
 7HXEQHU*µ6RFLHWDO&RQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP$OWHUQDWLYHVWR6WDWH-centred Constitutional 
7KHRU\"¶6WRUUV/HFWXUHV<DOH/DZ6FKRROLQ-RHUJHV&6DQG,-J and Teubner, G. (eds) 
Constitutionalism and Transnational Governance Hart: Oxford 3-28, 6 
21
 Gert Verschragen, supra note 6, 262 
22
 This acknowledgment of universal fundamental rights arguably runs somewhat counter to the 
positivism at the core of Luhmanian systems theory, which has been referred to DV WKH µGDXJKWHU RI
SRVLWLYLVP¶.  
23
 Gunther Teubner, µ-XVWLFH8QGHU*OREDO&DSLWDOLVP¶,QMichael Blecher and Jennifer Hendry (eds) 
µ*RYHUQDQFH&LYLO6RFLHW\DQG6RFLDO0RYHPHQWV6SHFLDO,VVXH¶Law & Critique 19(3) 329-
334, 332. 
24
 Richard Nobles and David Schiff, supra note 18, 199-200. 
 6 
will come as little surprise, although the issue of most interest here is actually the 
LQWHUSOD\ RU UDWKHU µVWUXFWXUDO FRXSOLQJ¶ RI WKHVH WZR V\VWHPV ZLWK HDFK RWKHU DQG
with the resultant effects both upon the general operation of the legal system and 
more widespread juridification dynamics.  
 
In terms of the political system, fingers can be pointed at the rights-violating 
(counterfactual) excesses immediately post-9/11, some of which, such as the 
Guantanamo Bay detention camp, still persist to this day. The ground for these 
political excesses was cleared by the shock of the 2001 international terrorist attack 
upon the twin towers of the World Trade Center, which not only sent many of the 
function systems of global society into spasm or crisis 25  by disrupting their 
operations,26 albeit momentarily, but then also contributed to a state of exception 
whereby the system of international politics was able to expand its sphere of 
influence. The means by which these particular circumstances gave rise to such 
developments are straightforward enough to pinpoint: they undermined the conditions 
under which the systemic safeguards of constitutional and human rights and social 
PRYHPHQWV FRXOG RSHUDWH WKXV GLVUXSWLQJ WKH OHJDO V\VWHP¶V RSHUDWLRQ RI ULJKWV
stabilization27 and removing the demands for systemic self-restriction. In this regard, 
7HXEQHU¶V REVHUYDWLRQ WKDW WKH µUHDO GDQJHrs are posed less by the dynamics of 
international politics and more by economic, scientific and technological rationality 
VSKHUHV¶28 while being both astute and prescient vis-à-vis the global financial crisis, 
as will be discussed in just a moment, nonetheless arguably downplays the destructive 
potential of international political power, especially when it is asymmetric to law.  
 
This quote from Teubner brings to the fore the difference between his standpoint and 
that of Luhmann on the issue of the scope of constitutional and human rights. 
Whereas Luhmann considers the political system to be the only one requiring self-
restraint, Teubner insists that other social systems need to be subject to the same 
controls provided for the political system by constitutional and human rights. The 
dangers of functional differentiation are as apparent and pernicious in other systems, 
VXFKDVWKHHFRQRP\ZKLFKLVµDVFDSDEOHRIGLVWRUWLQJWKHFRQGLWLRQDOSURJUDPPHV
RI RWKHU V\VWHPV DV LV SROLWLFV¶ 29  While recent excesses and crises within the 
economic system corroborate this claim, it does not immediately follow that the need 
to curb such expansionist tendencies makes constitutional and human rights the 
PHFKDQLVP WR GR VR 7KLV LV WKH µQRUPDWLYH WXUQ¶ RQ WKH SDUW RI 7HXEQHU the 
GHVLJQDWLRQRIKXPDQULJKWVDVWKHµOLQHRIGHIHQFHDJDLQVWWKHVWUXFWXUDOYLROHQFHRI
                                                        
25
 The excellent collection The Financial Crisis from Constitutional Perspective from Poul Kjaer, 
Gunther Teubner and Alberto Febbrajo (eds) (2011: Hart) has drawn attention to the issue of crisis and 
its articulation from systems-WKHRUHWLFDOSHUVSHFWLYH6HHLQSDUWLFXODU56WLFKZHKµ7RZDUGV$
*HQHUDO7KHRU\RI)XQFWLRQ6\VWHP&ULVHV¶-58  
26
 7KLVQRWLRQRIV\VWHPLFµVSDVP¶WR\VZLWKWKHLGHDWKDWWKHUHLVVRPHHQYLURQPHQWDOµQRLVH¶RU
µLUULWDWLRQ¶WKDWLVVLPSO\VRJUHDWWKDWLWKDVWKHHIIHFWRIPRPHQWDULO\GLVUXSWLQJWKHRUGHUFUHDWHGE\
operational closure. A spasm could arguably be generated through intense and cumulative 
SHUWXUEDWLRQVWRDV\VWHP¶VSULPDU\IXQFWLRQLQWHUPVRIWKHOHJDOV\VWHPWKLVSULPDU\IXQFWLRQLVWKH
stabilization of normative expectations, based upon its coding of legal/illegal.  
27
 As Verschraegen notes, the legal system operations pertaining to rights are positivization, 
interpretation and stabilization. Supra note 6, 263. 
28
 Gunther Teubner, supra note 23, 330. 
29
 Richard Nobles and David Schiff, supra note 18, 200. 
 7 
WKH ORJLFVRI V\VWHPV UXQQLQJDPRN¶30 Therefore while Luhmann would restrict the 
curbing effect of rights to the political system, based upon his descriptive premise and 
the evolution of human rights through periods of social segmentation, stratification 
and, finally, functional differentiation, Teubner detaches rights from the political with 
WKH DLP RI UHRULHQWLQJ WKHP WRZDUGV µWKH LQGHSHQGHQW ORJLF DQG LQGHSHQGHQW
UDWLRQDOLW\RIGLYHUVHVRFLDOFRQWH[WV¶.31  
 
So how do these observations relate to the specifics of the Kadi case? Interestingly, 
what can be observed is actually a situation of congruence of three function systems: 
politics, economics and law.  To start at the beginning, we can say that UN Resolution 
1267 (and indeed any other) is a structural coupling between the political and legal 
V\VWHPVUHSUHVHQWLQJWKHFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHµLQVWLWXWLRQDOLzHGSROLWLFV¶RIWKH81
(Teubner 2012: 50) and the normative (regulatory) character of the Resolution. 
Moreover, as the decision to blacklist on the strength of this Resolution affects the 
participation of Mr. Kadi within the economic system ± genuinely limiting his 
inclusion and participation with that system ± then the coupling can also be 
considered as one connecting the political and economic systems. Insofar as the issue 
concerns the enforcement of anti-terrorist-financing norms, however, these waters are 
muddied, for it is less immediately apparent as to whether the Resolution also 
represents a structural coupling between the legal and economic systems. To put this 
in another way, while the blacklisting of Mr. Kadi under Resolution 1267 and the 
µIUHH]LQJ¶ RI KLV ILQDQFLDO DVVHWV FHUWDLQO\ KDG normative effect by virtue of 
constituting an economic sanction, the normal operations of the legal system appear to 
have been disrupted by the excesses of the political system. The decision-making 
(power) occurs within the political, which in this case ± as we can now assert with the 
benefit of hindsight ± bypassed legal due process and overstepped its bounds.  
 
Accordingly, from systems perspective, it is the dominance of the global political 
system, represented here by the UN, that is problematic in terms of systemic excesses. 
)LUVW WKH LQLWLDO 81 LQFOXVLRQ RI 0U .DGL RQ WKH 81¶V FRQVROLGDWHG DQWL-terrorism 
lists under Security Council Resolution 1267 was not rights-compliant either in terms 
of procedure or in terms of ensuring adequate levels of judicial protection. Second, 
DOWKRXJK WKH HFRQRPLF µVDQFWLRQV¶ VXIIHUHG E\ 0U .DGL DSSHDU RQ ILUVW JODQFH WR
pertain to both the economy and the legal system, these are actually political decisions 
based upon protectioniVW LGHRORJLHV DQG µVRIW SRZHU¶ G\QDPLFV WKDW DUH QHWZRUNHG
beyond the ambit of the UN and thus also beyond its steering and/or control. In this 
UHJDUG WKHVH G\QDPLFV UHVHPEOH PRUH 7HXEQHU¶V µDQRQ\PRXV PDWUL[¶ 32  than the 
recognized political power exertion by nation States and their international 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV7KHGDQJHUWRLQGLYLGXDOV¶LQWHJULW\DVKHZRXOGSXWLWFDQEHVDLGWR
DULVH IURP µD PXOWLSOLFLW\ RI DQRQ\PRXV DQG JOREDOL]HG FRPPXQLFDWLYH SURFHVVHV¶
whereby the anonymous matrix of an autonomized communicative action is the 
µIXQGDPHQWDO-ULJKWVYLRODWRU¶.33 Finally, it can be asserted that there are inherent flaws 
                                                        
30
 Lyana Francot-Timmermans and  Emilios ChristodouOLGLVµ7KH1RUPDWLYH7XUQLQ7HXEQHU¶V
6\VWHPV7KHRU\RI/DZ¶,QWURGXFWLRQWRWKH6SHFLDO,VVXHZLWK*XQWKHU7HXEQHU40) 3 Netherlands 
Journal of Legal Philosophy E. (2011) 187-190, 188 
31
 ibid, 188; also Richard Nobles and David Schiff, supra note 18, 200-202  
32
  Gunther Teubner, µ7KH$QRQ\PRXV0DWUL[+XPDQ5LJKWV9LRODWLRQVE\µ3ULYDWH¶7UDQVQDWLRQDO
$FWRUV¶Modern Law Review 69  
33
 Gunther Teubner, supra note 23  
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ZLWKLQ WKH81¶VRSHUDWLRQDVLWXDWLRQ WKDWwas obviously recognized and reacted to 
by the creation of the UN Office of the Ombudsperson. 
 
Good Governance 
 
Whereby the issue of rights within systems theory can be discussed at the level of 
world society, that RIµJRRGJRYHUQDQFH¶UHODWHVVSHFLILFDOO\WRWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQDV
D µYLUWXRXV DFWRU¶ $OWKRXJK V\VWHPV WKHRU\ LV RIWHQ XQGHUVWRRG DV DQ DQWL-regional 
theory, like its anti-individualistic reputation this is somewhat over-stated. While 
systems of world society are differentiated from each other on the basis of their 
function, it is also the case that there is a subsequent system-internal differentiation 
(Binnendifferenzierung) that facilitates systemic understanding of environmental 
complexity in the form of jurisdiction- or territorial difference.34 To be clear, the EU 
can be considered as being both a legal and political actor. Indeed, its own boundaries 
and the borders of its constituent Member States are communications from the 
political system,35 which have an µLUULWDQW¶HIIHFW36 upon the secondary operations and 
programmes of the legal system. It is also important to note here that the virtue or 
otherwise of a position adopted by any actor, be it the CJEU or the EU more 
JHQHUDOO\ JRHV HIIHFWLYHO\ µXQVHHQ¶ E\ WKH OHJDO V\VWHP, which understands its 
environment in terms of its binary coding of legal/illegal,37 and it alone.  
 
As discussed above, the standpoint taken by the CJEU in its landmark judgment of 
September 2008 had the effect of establishing its clear stance on EU-internal human 
rights protections. While the procedural delay of three months prior to EU 
Commission implementation38  UHGXFHG WKH  GHFLVLRQ¶V LPSDFW WR EHLQJ PRUH
rhetorical than actual, especially insofar as it affected the specifics of Mr. Kadi¶V 
situation vis-à-YLV WKH µIUR]HQ¶ DVVHWV , VXEPLW WKDW WKLV MXGJPHQW DQG PRUH
importantly, its subsequent confirmation by the CJEU Grand Chamber in 2013 had 
the effect of generating and constituting an unchangeable standard39 within the legal 
system. Having stated its case with such fanfare, the EU has effectively now 
established a normative standard for itself that it now must maintain. This self-
restraint does not only pertain to the legal system, however, as it also has effects 
ZLWKLQ WKH SROLWLFDO V\VWHP 7KH &RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ KDG RYHUW SROLWLFDO FRQVHTXHQFHV
SDUWO\LQWHUPVRIWKH(8¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH81ZKLFKZLOOEHGLVFXVVHG in the 
next section, and partly in terms of its own identity as a rights-respecting, rights-
                                                        
34
 -HQQLIHU+HQGU\µ7KH'RXEOH)UDJPHQWDWLRQRI/DZ/HJDO6\VWHP-Internal Differentiation and the 
3URFHVV RI (XURSHDQL]DWLRQ¶. In Daniel Augenstein (ed), Integration Through Law Revisited: The 
Making of the European Polity (Ashgate 2012). 
35
  Anton Schütz, µ7KH7ZLOLJKWRIWKH*OREDO3ROLV2Q/RVLQJ3DUDGLJPV(QYLURQLQJ6\VWHPVDQG
2EVHUYLQJ:RUOG6RFLHW\¶,QGunther Teubner (ed.) Global Law Without a State (Aldershot 1997) 
279-294 
36
 Gunther Teubner, µLegal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New 
'LIIHUHQFHV¶0RGHUQ/DZ5HYLHZ-32 
37
 1LNODV/XKPDQQµ7KH&RGLQJRIWKH/HJDO6\VWHP¶,Q$OEHUWR)HEEUDMRDQG*XQWKHU7HXEQHUHGV
State, Law, Economy as Autopoietic Systems (Giuffre 1992). 
38
 The ECJ followed the reasRQLQJ LQ$GYRFDWH*HQHUDO0DGXUR¶V2Sinion and decided in favour of 
protecting fundamental rights but stopped short of the immediate invalidation of the challenged EU 
measures, instead allowing their continuation for another three months and thus providing time for the 
Commission to become rights-compliant. 
39
 Niklas Luhmann, Law As A Social System (OUP 2004) 17.  
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compliant polity. When viewed from a V\VWHP¶V WKHRUHWLFDO SHUVSHFWLYH WKH 
legal ruling in Kadi has the irritant effect of constituting this (restricted) political 
SRVLWLRQ IRU WKH (8 DQG WKXV JHQHUDWLQJ D µ³UXOH RI ODZ´ UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ
>SROLWLFV@ DQG ODZ¶. 40  In essence, the limitations placed upon the political are 
simultaneously self-limitations ± in a similar sense to those represented by 
constitutional and human rights, as discussed above ± and limitations derived from 
the operations of the legal system. 
 
Even more interesting is the subsequent challenge to this stance in the form of the 
appeal by the Commission, the Council and the United Kingdom (UK) and its 2013 
UHMHFWLRQDVWKLVDOORZVXVWRFKDUWLWVGHYHORSPHQWIURPDµUXOHRIODZ¶UHODWLRQVKLSWR
a constitutional one. Nobles and Schiff outline this trajectory as follows:  
 
µ7KHQH[WVWHS LIRQHLV WRPRYHLQWRDµFRQVWLWXWLRQDO¶ OHYHO LVIRU WKe legal 
rules which support a social system to develop a distinction between 
changeable and unchangeable law.41 This distinction provides a basis for the 
legal system to limit what support it provides to the social system. For this 
distinction to operate as a mutual self-limitation, it must be repeated (re-
HQWHUHG ZLWKLQ WKDW VRFLDO V\VWHP¶V RZQ FRPPXQLFDWLRQV JHQHUDWLQJ
VWUXFWXUHVRIFRPPXQLFDWLRQZKLFKLGHQWLI\WKHV\VWHP¶VRZQYHUVLRQRIZKDW
LVIXQGDPHQWDODQGQRWRSHQWRFKDQJH¶42 
 
As stated, the requirement for mutual systemic self-limitation is that the distinction 
between law that is changeable and law that is not is re-entered into the system, in 
this case the political system. This process of re-entry (Wiedereintritt) presents us 
with one of the paradoxes at the heart of systems theory, namely that what is being 
reintroduced into the system is the very distinction between system and environment 
upon which the system depends.43 The distinction re-entered into the political system, 
therefore, can be recognized as its (political) systemic understanding of the (legal) 
judgment, which has the effect of operating as a mutual self-limitation on both of the 
function systems. The effect of the CJEU setting out their stall in Kadi 2008 to 
characterize the EU as both virtuous and rights-compliant ± a stance generally 
accepted as being political in nature44 ± is that the political system at the EU level is 
now subject to self-imposed restraints pertaining to that virtuous declaration of 
intent.  
 
Not that this is a new position in terms of EU politics, of course, especially in the field 
of human rights. These have been employed collectively as jurisdictional and identity 
determinants for the EU ever since their genesis, developing internally within the EU 
µLQ FRQMXQFWLRQ ZLWK D QDUUDWLYH WKDW VRXJKW WR FRQVWUXFW DQ LGHQWLW\ with the 
Community[, while e]xternally, the narrative was concerned with the identity of the 
&RPPXQLW\¶.45 7KH (8¶V VHOI-description in this respect becomes altogether more 
                                                        
40
 Richard Nobles and David Schiff, µ3XOOLQJ%DFNIURPWKH(GJH"5HYLHZRI7HXEQHU¶V&RQVWLWXWLRQDO
Fragments¶, 76(3) Modern Law Review (2013) 620±638, 623 
41
 My emphasis. Please note that Nobles & Schiff here rely on insights from Niklas Luhmann, supra 
note 38, 17. 
42
 Richard Nobles and David Schiff, supra note 39, 623. 
43
 Miguel Torres Morales, Systemtheorie, Diskurstheorie und das Recht der Transzendentalphilosophie 
(Königshausen & Neumann, 2002) 118. 
44
 Gráinne de Búrca, supra note 4 
45
 Andrew Williams, EU Human Rights Policies: A Study in Irony (Oxford: OUP) 179. 
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LPSRUWDQWZKHQWKHIRFXVLVH[WHQGHGIURPµJRRGJRYHUQDQFH¶DWWKHOHYHORIWKH(8
to that of global governance, most notably in terms of the apparent disconnect, at least 
in practical terms, between the respective stances of the EU and the UN. The vagaries 
of multi-level governance and the attendant issues of authority and plurality are the 
focus of the next section.  
 
Multi-level Governance, Plurality and Authority 
 
Takis Tridimas recently observed that, when it comes to Kadi, ZHDUHµIDFHG«ZLWK
the problem of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, WRZKLFKWKHUHLVQRFRQFOXVLYHDQVZHU¶.46 The 
clash of legitimate authority claims illuminated by this case has been a subject of 
much debate since even before the decision was handed down; indeed, it would be 
disingenuous even now to suggest that the recent appeal judgment has put this debate 
to bed. In that regard, a systems theorist might be forgiven for the temptation to assert 
WKHWKHRU\¶VUDGLFDOO\DQWL-regional character and potential for abstraction: to point to 
the decentralization and fragmentation of world politics47 and skip merrily away from 
the problems of complex structure! But systems theory offers much in terms of fresh 
perspectives on entrenched debates, so this final section will endeavour to suggest 
some alternatives to debating the same established tension with reference to the 
asymmetry between the legal and political systems at the global level. It should be 
QRWHGDWWKLVVWDJHWKDWWKHµSOXUDOLW\¶JHQHUDWHGE\WKHGHFLVLRQLQKadi is not that of 
worldwide legal pluralism and the normative diversity that is claimed by and attaches 
to ethnic and cultural communities48 but rather one of multiple (dual) authority and 
competence claims from regulatory regimes at various levels of world society.  
 
First, having mentioned the innate anti-regionality of systems theory, a note on spatial 
issues. The particular accommodation of territorial considerations within systems 
theory have already been discussed in the preceding section but they bear some more 
VFUXWLQ\ KHUH HVSHFLDOO\ LQ WHUPV RI KRZ WKH LQWHUDFWLRQ RI GLIIHUHQW µOHYHOV¶ 49  of 
different function systems is understood from systems theoretical perspective. The 
KDUGUHJLPHERXQGDULHVWKDWFUHDWHVXFKµOHYHOV¶DUHVXEMHFWWRHOLVLRQE\DWKeoretical 
approach that differentiates primarily upon the basis of function, but this is not to say 
WKDWWKH\DUHYDQTXLVKHGHQWLUHO\2QWKHFRQWUDU\LQVWHDGRIDQDEVROXWHµGLVPLVVDORI
JHRJUDSK\¶, 50  subsequent system-internal processes of differentiation occur to 
reconstruct jurisdictional and territorial specificity within the relevant function 
systems on the terms of those function systems. To give an example here: the 
LQWHUQDOO\ GLIIHUHQWLDWHG µ*HUPDQ¶ SDUW RI WKH OHJDO V\VWHP ZLOO µVHH¶ DQG
operationalize a judgment of the Budesverfassungsgericht differently to equivalent 
parts corresponding to other EU Member States. Any multi-level conflict arising is, 
                                                        
46
 Takis Tridimas, µ(FRQRPLF6DQFWLRQV3URFHGXUDO5LJKWVDQG-XGLFLDO6FUXWLQ\3RVW-Kadi 
'HYHORSPHQWV¶ (2013) 489.  
47
 Marcelo Neves, Transconstitutionalism (Hart 2013) 58 
48
 Gunther TeubnerµGlobal Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World-Society (1996). In Gunther 
Teubner (ed.) Global Law Without A State (Dartmouth, 1997) 3-286HHDOVR*XQWKHU7HXEQHUµLegal 
Regimes of Global Non-6WDWH$FWRUV¶ in the same volume. 
49
 This is not to introduce a hierarchical element, which would of course be antithetical to systems 
theory, but rather to help convey the idea of separate areas within the overarching function system.  
50
 Anton Schütz , supra note 35. 
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therefore, also a system-internal one, thus avoiding any discussion of structural 
coupling51 or cross-systemic irritation.  
 
Systems theory consequently offers the opportunity of considering the issue in 
relation to the legal system and the legal system alone. Following the reasoning 
above, it can be asserted that the EU legal order is, by means of legal system-internal 
GLIIHUHQWLDWLRQDQLQWHUQDOFRQVWUXFWWKDWRSHUDWHVDFFRUGLQJWRWKHV\VWHP¶VVHFRQGDU\
programmes, which is to say, according to its own rules of operation. This situation is 
one created by the Treaties, binding undertakings on the part of the signatory Member 
States that constitute structural couplings between the legal and the political. 
Moreover, the particular nature of EU law in relation to that of its Member States ± 
which is to say, its penetrative quality resulting from the doctrine of direct effect ± 
means that this internal construct also includes many Member State legal operations, 
and broadly symmetrical ones at that. Legal-systemic unity is untroubled by this 
arrangement, which is conflict-averse in nature. Things are complicated, however, by 
the inclusion of UN norms within the system ± and I use the term norms specifically 
here ± not least by the issues of procedure, legitimacy, efficacy, enforceability and 
practicality engendered by the struggle to determine competence. The solution, such 
as there is one, may be located in the recognition that while UNSC Resolutions are 
certainly normative, they lack the requisite robust legality in order validly to 
countermand EU-related systemic operations.  
 
This widespread weakness of law at the international level is in sharp contrast to that 
of law at EU level; nevertheless, law is not the only function system show in town, so 
to speak. Instead of viewing the UN from the perspective of the legal system, 
therefore, it follows that it is rather the political system that is kinder to the UN, 
ZKLFK LV DIWHU DOO D UHJLPH RI µLQVWLWXWLRQDOL]HG SROLWLFV¶.52 In contrast to the legal 
system, where the EU legal order occupies a position of stUHQJWKDQGWKH81µOHJDO¶
order is comparatively weak, a shift in focus to the political system and, indeed, its 
LQWHUDFWLRQZLWKDQGLUULWDWLRQRIWKHOHJDOV\VWHPDQGWKH81¶VSROLWLFDOSRZHUFRPHV
to the fore. What can be observed here is a general asymmetry in terms of the legal 
and the political on the global scale, to the extent that law finds itself directly 
subordinated to power.53 This asymmetry was hinted at earlier in the section on rights, 
where constitutional and human rights were cited as buffers against the excesses of 
systemic over-reach and processes of de-differentiation.54  
 
In this sense it is not difficult to see the task law faces, not only to maintain its 
position at the international level but also to avoid any further erosion. One could 
query at this point whether or not such dangers can be understood as giving rise to a 
systemic crisis, 55  ZKLFK FDQ EH VDLG WR RFFXU ZKHQ D V\VWHPV¶ RSHUDWLRQV DQG
                                                        
51
 µ)XQFWLRQV\VWHPVFDQ HQWHULQWR³VWUXFWXUDOFRXSOLQJ´ZLWKHDFKRWKHUVRWKDWWKHLUDXWRSRLHVLV± 
though still operationally closed ± LVLQFRQWDFWZLWKWKDWRIDQRWKHUV\VWHPV>«@6WUXFWXUDOFRXSOLQJ
does not violate the operational closure of systems, rather it establishes specific relations between 
GLIIHUHQWDXWRSRLHWLFSURFHVVHV¶6HH+DQV-Georg Moellers, Luhmann Explained: From Souls to 
Systems (Open Court 2006) 37 
52
 Gunther Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization (Hart: 
2012) 50. 
53
 Marcelo Neves, supra note 47, 62). 
54
 De-differentiation can be described as the encroachment by one system onto the territory of another; 
DQRYHUVWHSSLQJRIDV\VWHP¶VRZQV\VWHPLFERXQGV 
55
 Poul Kjaer, Gunther Teubner and Alberto Febbrajo (eds), supra note 25.  
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procedures are disturbed, but it would be overblown to jump automatically to this 
conclusion. Indeed, while there is an asymmetry of politics and law at the 
international level, with politics the ascendant, the reverse is arguably true at the EU 
level.56 This is an uncomfortable situation under a societal horizontal order premised 
upon the conditLRQ WKDW µQR V\VWHP SRVVHVVHV D VWUXFWXUDO SULPDF\ YLV-à-vis other 
V\VWHPV¶.57 However, rather than shout µcrisis¶, it would more likely be a better idea to 
look beyond the trials of a single function system to the dual asymmetry that the Kadi 
case sheds light upon, and to query whether this is in fact symptomatic of a broader 
malaise. 
 
 
                                                        
56
 For an in-depth discussion of the EU as a polity created by and through law, see Daniel Augenstein 
(ed.) µ,QWHJUDWLRQ7KURXJK/DZ¶5HYLVLWHG7KH0DNLQJRIWKH(XURSHDQ3ROLW\(Ashgate 2012) 
57
 Ibid, specifically the Introduction, xvi. 
